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SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATEA Constitutional View
PAUL G. KAUPER*

T

freely,
is not a term found in either the federal or the state constitutions.
It is a symbolic term used to describe relationships between law and
religion, between government and the churches, between the civil community and the religious community. In terms of the American constitutional tradition, separation of Church and State rests on the premise
that the functions of Church and State are not to be commingled, that
each has its separate task to perform, that the Church is concerned with
spiritual and moral matters affecting both its members and the whole
community and that the State, as a secular instrument which enjoys a
monopoly of coercive power, is concerned with the government of the
civil community. It is not the State's business to operate a church or to
prescribe an official creed for its citizens, and it is not the function of the
churches to run the government. Each within its own sphere is supreme.
Neither is to dominate the other. This separateness serves the cause
of human freedom. Because it is not the State's business to interfere
with or intervene in religious matters, whether by restricting the exercise of religious freedom or by using its coercive power to compel belief,
separation, while assuring the freedom of religion for the individual and
churches, also assures freedom for the nonconformist and nonbeliever.
Likewise, by assuring the freedom of the state from ecclesiastical domination, the separation principle protects against the imposition by the
Church, through the State, of its beliefs and views upon the civil community.
Having in mind the long history of this problem and the unfortunate
consequences of either State domination over the Church or the Church's
HE TERM, "SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE," used so
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domination over the State, we can be grateful in this country for a tradition of separation that has contributed so much to
freedom, to civic peace, and to the strength
and vitality of religion and of the churches.
In a land with as many diverse religious
groups as the United States, separation of
Church and State is essential to secure the
conditions of civil peace and harmony.
Our experience amply demonstrates that
religious life flourishes best when religion
depends on the voluntary adherence and
support of the believer and not on coercive
power exercised by the State.
Co-operative Separatism
It should be equally clear, however, that
in the American tradition the doctrine and
practice of separation of Church and State
and the concept of the secular and neutral
State has not meant, as in some countries,
the hostility of government to religion or
even indifference to the significance of religion in the life of the community. On the
contrary, American experience has demonstrated that consistent with separation of
Church and State, the State and the
churches can live in a state of friendly cooperation. We may describe this situation
as "co-operative separatism."
To describe this relationship in terms of
a metaphor like "the wall of separation of
Church and State" is inaccurate and misleading. This is so for several reasons. In
the first place, the figure of a "wall" suggests the drawing of a fixed and clear line
between the domain of government, on the
one hand, and of religion, on the other.
By nature this is impossible. We see this
more clearly when we realize that what we
are talking about is the relation between
the civil and religious community. All are
members of the civil community. But a

part are members of the smaller religious
community embraced within the larger civil
community. There can be no wall dividing
those citizens who are members of both
communities.
Secondly, the "wall" concept suggests
that a line can be drawn which clearly
separates the function of Church and State.
This is not an accurate portrayal. The
truth is that even though the principal functions of government and of organized religion are separate and distinct, there is an
area of overlapping or concurrent function
in which they have a common interest, the
area, indeed, which is the source of our
chief problems today. Thus, in the field
of education and social welfare, government and religious organizations have common interests.
Finally, the "wall" metaphor is misleading in so far as it suggests that Church and
State have nothing to do with each other.
Perhaps it would be better to speak of a
fence since, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has
said, "Good fences make good neighbors."
But the really important point is that
government and law, on the one hand, and
religion, on the other, serve each other's
needs. The churches and their members
depend upon the State to provide those
conditions of public peace and security and
the public services necessary to enable the
churches to enjoy freedom and to accomplish their mission. The authority of the
State and the effective maintenance of the
peace of the community are indispensable
to the free exercise of religion. Conversely,
the churches perform a valuable function
for the State by helping to create the spiritual climate and the respect for moral and
ethical values that furnish the foundation
of our free and democratic society. Whether
we put the matter in terms of natural law,
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or in terms of the churches' discharge of a
prophetic ministry, or the spiritual leavening of the community, the churches and
the intangible forces generated by their
witness and teaching make their contributions to the welfare of the civil community.
Just as the relationship between Church
and State cannot be described in terms of
a "wall of separation," so it is equally true
that at no time in our history has this relationship been characterized as "absolute
and complete separation of Church and
State." This is true only if we are thinking
of formal control arrangements. To be
sure our governments operate no churches
and have no voice or representation in the
affairs of the churches, and in turn the
churches have no representation or voice
in government. Here we have absolute
and complete separation. But if we turn
to the substance of things, it is readily apparent that in the American tradition of
Church-State relations and consistent,
therefore, with the historic American understanding of separation of Church and
State, government has recognized the importance and relevancy of religion in
American life and has accommodated its
policies to this situation. The acknowledgement in many of our state constitutions of
dependence upon God, the references to a
Deity in our national anthem, the annual
Thanksgiving proclamations, the opening
of sessions of Congress by prayer, the commissioning of chaplains for the armed forces
and the recognition of the place of chaplains in providing a spiritual ministry for
those in hospitals and prisons, the authorization of marriages by ministers, priests
and rabbis-all signify the awareness by
government of the place of religion in
American thought and life. Moreover, government has recognized the service ren-
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dered by churches to the community by
granting them immunity to property taxes
for property owned and held for religious
purposes, as well as deductions under the
income, estate and gift tax laws for contributions made to religious organizations.
The laws of the states have facilitated the
work of religious bodies by authorizing the
incorporation of churches, congregations
and auxiliary organizations. Finally, it
should be noted and emphasized that the
federal government, in disbursing funds
and property for specified purposes coming within the power of the federal government to spend for the general welfare, has
extended this aid impartially to all organizations and institutions that help to achieve
the public objectives of the spending program, including aid to institutions under
the control of religious bodies. This is in
the area of concurrent or overlapping functions. Thus, under the Hill-Burton Act,
grants to assist in the construction of new
hospital facilities have been made to all
qualified hospitals, including those operated
under religious auspices. Similarly, colleges
operated by church bodies have shared in
loans from the federal government to build
income-producing facilities such as dormitories and cafeterias, in grants for the purpose of enabling schools and colleges to acquire certain facilities for the teaching
of science, language and mathematics, and
in the distribution of federal surplus property. That church colleges have benefited
from all these programs is indisputable.
But it is also indisputable that the assistance furnished these institutions has advanced the general welfare of the nation.
Finally, I should mention that the separation principle has not been construed in
practice to require denial of governmental
benefits to persons in situations where reli-
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gious bodies or institutions could be said
to receive indirect aid from these benefits.
I call your attention, for instance, to the
granting of G. I. benefits to students, loans
to college students and free lunches for
school children. The fact that some students may attend church colleges and parochial schools does not disqualify them
for these benefits.
I have reviewed at some length the various types of situations in which government has recognized the significance of religion in our national life, has accommodated its tax policy in recognition of the
contribution made by religion to the community, and in the impartial distribution of
financial benefits designed to serve the general welfare has made grants to all institutions serving the national purpose, including institutions operated under church
auspices. Surely these practices make clear
that it has not been the general understanding in the American interpretation of the
separation principle that government must
be indifferent to religion and its contribution to the national life, that it cannot in
various ways give limited assistance on a
nondiscriminatory basis to religious functions and activities, or that in the disbursement of public funds for social welfare
functions, it must discriminate against religious bodies rendering services that government may properly support or subsidize.
Certainly these practices do not point to a
"wall of separation" between Church and
State, to absolute and complete separation
or to the conclusion that government can
do nothing which in fact aids religion. In
none of these cases is the government favoring one church over another, attempting
to prescribe by compulsion a national creed
forcing religion on unbelievers or attempt-

ing to operate or control a church or
churches.
Constitutional Interpretation

The American tradition of separation of
Church and State finds its legal expression
in the provisions of the federal and state
constitutions, and attention will now be
directed to the question of constitutional
interpretation. Both because of time limitations and because the current questions
and controversies turn on the provisions
of the federal constitution which explicitly
limit Congress and which by judicial act
have been made applicable to the states, I
shall confine my discussion to the federal
provisions. But before doing so, I should
make clear that many state constitutions
contain explicit provisions which on their
face prescribe specific limitations on the expenditure of public funds which are more
rigid than those stated in the federal constitution. Often these provisions limit expenditure to institutions under public control,
and in many cases they prohibit the use
of public funds to assist sectarian education
or to assist schools which are controlled by
religious bodies. It is clear that under these
state constitutional provisions any aid to
parochial schools or to church colleges in
support of their educational programs
would be unconstitutional.
We turn then to the federal constitution.
The first amendment says that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . .

."

Here is the language

on which discussion and controversy are
centered. This is the language which in its
twin phrases is interpreted to incorporate
the principle of separation of Church and
State into the federal constitution. What
does it mean? I think we all have a good
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idea of what is meant by the "free exercise" of religion. This embraces freedom
of religion in its fullest dimensions-freedom of conscience, freedom of worship,
freedom to organize and operate churches,
to preach and teach, to evangelize and to
seek to win converts-in short, all that is
embraced within the concept of religious
activity. But what is meant by a law respecting "an establishment of religion."
Its meaning is not so clear and scholars
are not agreed on the original significance
of these words as used by the drafters. Did
it mean that Congress could not set up a
national church? Certainly this would be
its minimum content. Did it mean that
Congress could not favor one religion over
another and that as between religions it
must maintain neutrality? Certainly this is
an interpretation that well fits the American religious scene and the diversity of religions found here. Does it mean something more than this?
At this point we look to Supreme Court
decisions for illumination and to key statements found in important cases. The first
occurred in the course of the majority
opinion in the well-known and now famous
case of Everson v. Board of Educ., where
the Court held constitutional a local school
board's action in providing bus transportation at the expense of public tax funds
for children attending parochial as well as
public schools. This was the specific problem before the Court, and the majority
found nothing unconstitutional about the
school board's action. It is evident, therefore, that anything the Court said in that
case about what either Congress or the
states may not do to aid religion was dictum. The principal paragraph of Mr. Justice Black's much-quoted dictum in this
case reads as follows:

The 'establishment of religion' clause of the
First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect 'a wall of separation
between church and state ... '
It will be noted that the Court in this
broad dictum, purporting to interpret the
nonestablishment clause, included some
ideas that clearly come under the free
exercise of religion concept. Any attempt
by government to force or influence a person to remain away from church or to profess a disbelief in any religion or to punish him for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or for church attendance
would be a clear violation of religious freedom. What appears in this dictum as distinctively an interpretation of the non-establishment idea is that the government
cannot set up a church, pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer
one religion over another, force or influence a person to go to church, force him
to profess a belief in religion, punish him
for disbelief or nonattendance at church,
levy a tax to support any religious activities
or institutions that teach or practice relig-
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ion, or participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups. In short,
nonestablishment means that the government can do nothing to sanction or aid religion. Translated in terms of the right of
the individual, this means that a person
enjoys a constitutional right to be free
from any governmentally-sanctioned religion. Finally, it should be noted that Mr.
Justice Black concludes this part of his
opinion by referring to Jefferson's famous
statement that the Constitution is intended
to erect "a wall of separation between
church and state."
That nonestablishment should mean
that the government may not sanction a
particular religion or establishment or force
religion on anyone is understandable. Such
a construction promotes both the freedom
of the believer and the freedom of the unbeliever, and both are entitled to constitutional protection. On this basis the Court,
at its second last session, held invalid the
provision of the Maryland Constitution
requiring a declaration of belief in God as
a condition of holding public office. Likewise, on the same basis, the Court this past
term declared unconstitutional the nonsectarian prayer sanctioned by New York law
and used in some of the public schools in
that state. I shall say more about this
decision later.
Returning to Mr. Justice Black's opinion
in the Everson case, it is his statement that
government cannot aid all religions that
presents the real difficulty. Did this mean
that government could, under no circumstances, do anything to recognize and encourage religious activities or that, in granting assistance for valid public purposes in
areas where both government and the
churches operate, it was required to discriminate against religious organizations

which, along with others, help discharge
these functions? If this is what was meant,
then was this intended by the language
of the first amendment? As I have previously indicated, it is, indeed, highly doubtful that this was intended. Moreover, the
various practices engaged in by government that I detailed above cast serious
doubt on the authenticity of an interpretation of the first amendment which would
require invalidation of any governmental
practice that can be seen as an "aid to religion." Indeed, the Everson case itself rejects this notion since the actual holding
was that a school board could use public
funds to reimburse parents for the cost of
transporting children to parochial as well
as to public schools. In short, the Constitution does not require a state to discriminate against children attending parochial
schools when disbursing funds for school
transportation.
I should like here to stress the point in
respect to discrimination. It seems quite
clear that to discriminate in the enjoyment
of legal privilege because of religion is in
itself a violation of religious freedom. To
permit parks to be used for all assemblies
except religious assemblies, to levy a special
tax on religious activities alone, to forbid
owning of property by religious societies,
to deny the benefit of police and fire protection to property solely because it is used
for religious purposes, would all be instances of discrimination on the ground of
religion. The point I am making here in
regard to the "no aid" argument is that, if
pressed to the extreme of denying to religion and religious activities, rights and
privileges otherwise generally recognized
under law, it becomes a means of defeating
the free exercise of religion.
The decisions that immediately followed
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Everson dealt with the released-time problem. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board
of Educ., the majority held invalid a released-time arrangement whereby public
school property was used for the teaching
of religion by teachers supplied by the primary religious groups, but at the expense
of one hour per week of school time. Participation in the program was voluntary,
and children whose parents objected to
participation were assigned other school
activities during this period. The majority
of the Court considered the released-time
program to be an unlawful involvement by
the public school system in a program
of religious education. As the majority saw
it, the churches were using the schools as
a means of recruiting students for religious
education classes under circumstances that
resulted in coercion of students to attend.
But here again we have a dissenting view,
this time by Mr. Justice Reed, who felt that
the majority were running the separation
argument into the ground, and in support
of this, he pointed to many instances in
American history where the State had taken
a sympathetic view with respect to education for religious purposes.
Broadly interpreted, McCollum could
have meant that the separation principle
derived from the non-establishment limitation requires the State to be completely
indifferent to religion and to the interest of
parents in religious education. This is the
only actual decision by the Supreme Court
where the holding can be said to rest on
a broad theory of separation of Church
and State. Actually the case could easily
be interpreted more narrowly to mean that
the State may not make itself a party to
any scheme whereby religious education is
forced on children in the public schools. A
broad interpretation of the case was repu-
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diated by the later decision in Zorach v.
Clauson where the Court sharply limited
McCollum by its holding that a program
of released time for religious education
of children in the public schools was constitutional, provided that the classes were
not conducted on the school premises. For
all practical purposes, a majority of the
Court had now swung around to the views
expressed by Mr. Justice Reed in dissent
in the McCollum case. This becomes evident when we look more closely at Mr.
Justice Douglas' majority opinion and
also at the opinions written for the four
dissenting Justices who argued strenuously
that the distinction between this case and
the McCollum case was insubstantial and
even trivial, and did not warrant a difference in result. The dissenters appear to be
right in saying that there was no substantial distinction between the two cases.
What is far more important was Mr. Justice
Douglas' opinion in Zorach. Speaking for
a majority of the Court, he sharply limited
the language previously used in the Everson
case. Indeed, in view of the fact that
Zorach is a later case, it is surprising that
in so much of the current discussion of
Church-State problems in their constitutional aspects, the fashion is to quote the
Everson opinion even though it was substantially weakened by what Mr. Justice
Douglas said in Zorach. In the course of
his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas said:
We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee
the freedom to worship as one chooses. We
make room for as wide a variety of beliefs
and creeds as the spiritual needs of man
deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on
the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each
flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the
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state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious
nature of our people and accommodates
the public service to their spiritual needs.
To hold that it may not would be to find
in the Constitution a requirement that the
government show a callous indifference to
religious groups. That would be preferring
those who believe in no religion over those
who do believe. Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and
sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any
person. But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to
throw its weight against efforts to widen
the effective scope of religious influence.
The government must be neutral when it
comes to competition between sects. It may
not thrust any sect on any person. It may
not make a religious observance compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend
church, to observe a religious holiday, or
to take religious instruction. But it can
close its doors or suspend its operations as
to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction.
No more than that is undertaken here.
Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the
majority in the Zorach case is quoted at
length since it reflects a basic difference
in approach. To be sure, it overlaps in
large part what was said in Everson. The
government may not finance religious
groups, must be neutral between sects, cannot undertake religious instruction or force
religion, religious instruction or a religious
observance on anyone. There are notable
points of difference, however, and these
points of difference become crucial and
central in any discussion of the problem.
First of all, the Zorach opinion recognizes
that the first amendment itself says nothing

about the separation of Church and State.
Separation is not in itself a starting point
in constitutional thinking. It follows and
is required only to the extent that it flows
from the clauses relating to non-establishment and the free exercise of religion.
The first amendment, then, according to
Zorach, does not ordain a complete and
absolute separation of Church and State
in every respect. Implicitly, the Court in
Zorach repudiates the notion that the first
amendment establishes a "wall of separation" between Church and State, for the
"wall" terminology and imagery is based
upon a notion of absolute and complete
separation. Moreover, in Zorach, the Court
emphasized the idea that the legislative
body of a state may take into account the
religious interests of its citizens and adapt
its legislative program to that end at least
so far as accommodation of public facilities
and services is concerned. Here, in other
words, is a disclaimer of the idea that the
state must be completely neutral as between religion and nonreligion. At least so
far as the first amendment is concerned,
the Court says that the legislature may take
account of the religious interests of its
people in its legislative programs so long
as it does not act with coercive effect upon
dissenters and nonbelievers, and no preference is given to any one religious group.
In short, the government is not required
to act as thoughreligion and religious institutions did not exist. It may go further
and find that they perform a useful and
desirable function in the social community, even a public purpose, and that within the limits imposed by the Constitution,
their activities may be encouraged and
favored by the State. Finally, it is significant that the Court said in the Zorach
case that the problem of separation of

9
Church and State, like many problems in
constitutional law, is one of degree. Indeed,
this may be the most significant statement
in the whole case. The problems in this
area cannot be solved by resort to doctrinaire absolutes, verbal formulae or metaphors. As in the case of all constitutional
adjudications, the Court must look at these
problems in terms of the competing interests at stake and, therefore, take a critical
look both at what the State is trying to do
and what are the fundamental purposes
served by the constitutional restrictions.
Important Church-State problems came
before the Court again in the Sunday Closing Cases decided in 1960. The argument
was made that since the purpose of the
Sunday closing laws was to promote obervance of the Christian Sabbath, they were
invalid as an attempt to establish the Christian religion. The Court's answer was that
Sunday closing laws served a valid secular
purpose in setting aside a day of rest.
What is particularly important to observe
was the Court's observation that legislation aimed at valid secular purposes is
not rendered invalid because it may at the
same time have the secondary effect of aiding religion. Noteworthy also was the point
of emphasis in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion that the purpose of
the first amendment was to keep the legislature from dealing with religion as such.
The Prayer Case
I conclude this survey of the case materials by returning to the Court's latest decision in the series, namely, the recent decision holding invalid the New York nonsectarian prayer as prescribed for use in
public schools. In comment, let me say
that, in my opinion, not much was lost by
requiring the elimination of this prayer
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situation. The mechanical and routine repetition of a prayer with so little substantive
content as this nonsectarian prayer does
not in my opinion do much to advance the
cause of religion. Indeed, religion may suffer from such practices. On the constitutional question, I agree that it is not the
State's business to engage in or prescribe
religious practices in a situation like that
in the public schools, where such practices
are offensive to the conscience and beliefs
of some parents and children and the practicalities of the situation operate as a coercive force to compel conformity. I suppose that, consistent with this case, a
school may allow opportunity for silent
prayer or even for voluntary prayers by
children, since the Court's emphasis was
upon the fact that the prayer objected to
was an officially approved and sanctioned
prayer. Moreover, the Court indicated
that its decision did not affect patriotic
exercises that mention a Deity or the singing of patriotic songs which acknowledge
dependence upon God. My difficulties
with the case arise from the Court's reliance upon the argument that such a prayer
exercise was an establishment of religion,
the failure to put the emphasis upon the
rights of nonconformists to be free from
religious practices prescribed by the State,
and the further failure to indicate what interest must be shown to have been violated
in order to give standing to a person to
raise questions of this kind. It seems to
me that a person should be required to
show that the governmental practices of
which he complains impair either his freedom of conscience or his interest as a taxpayer.
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion deserves special attention. Finding that
the prayer was voluntary and did not result
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in coercion of nonconformists, and admitting that this prayer exercise was not an establishment of religion in the historic sense
of the word, he based his concurrence on
the ground that the government was using
financial resources, namely, the public
school system, to promote religion and this
use of public property and the educational
system in specific support of a religious
practice is unconstitutional. Of special interest was his intimation that the Everson
case was incorrectly decided-a conclusion
that may have substantial significance for
the future. Apparently Mr. Justice Douglas now feels that any governmental practice which results in aid to religion and religious instruction is unconstitutional.
Some Relevant Deductions
What conclusions, then, can be drawn
from the Supreme Court's decision on the
interpretation of the first amendment?
1) While the Court has construed this
amendment to state a principle of separation of Church and State, has acted rigorously under it to protect religious freedhm and has invalidated some state practices found to constitute an establishment of
religion, the Court as yet has failed to agree
on general principles of interpretation that
furnish some safe guide in determining the
application of the amendment to situations
we face today. In particular, the Court
needs to refine the interpretation of the
non-establishment language and what is
meant by "aid to religion." Any prediction, for instance, that the Court will or
will not uphold the constitutionality of federal spending in support of parochial as
well as other schools is hazardous. At most,
one can suggest arguments and conclusions
based on prior decisions and opinions that
do not go directly to this question.

2) Although the Court has said that the
first amendment prohibits aid to religion,
it is evident from results reached that this
language cannot be literally construed. The
decisions in the bus transportation case
and the Sunday Closing Cases, both sustaining legislation directed to secular ends
but having the effect also of aiding religion,
make clear, it seems to me, that these questions cannot be resolved by the "aid" test.
Long sanctioned historical practices, such as
tax exemptions, support this conclusion as
well as the further conclusion that we add
nothing to the solution of these problems
by talking about a "wall of separation" between Church and State or about absolute
and complete separation. Absolute separation or an absolute application of the
"no aid" principle is impossible when we
consider the inevitable and inherent interrelationship between the civil and religious
communities, the areas of overlapping and
concurrent functions, and the consideration
that a literal application of the "no aid"
idea, so as to discriminate in the enjoyment of right and privilege solely on the
ground of religion, would itself raise the
serious question whether such discrimination was an unconstitutional restriction on
religious freedom.
3) Not only has the Supreme Court not
ruled that federal aid for parochial schools
would be unconstitutional, but, on the contrary, substantial arguments can be made
that such legislation would be constitutional
if part of a program for federal assistance
to schools generally. Since spending for
education is for the general welfare, since
parochial schools meet the educational
standards prescribed by state law, since
sending children to these schools discharges the obligation of parents, imposed
by law, to send children to a school that
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meets the state's standards, and since parents in sending children to a parochial
school are exercising a constitutional freedom of choice, a case may be made out to
support the conclusion that federal aid to
these schools, as part of a general school
assistance program, would not be condemned as an establishment of religion, or
as forbidden aid to religion, but rather upheld as legislation in support of the public
purposes served by these schools as part of
the total educational system, particularly if
the aid were limited to grants for the construction of facilities and acquisition of
equipment and excluded any support such
as salaries paid to teachers.
Others would go further. Professor Kurland of Chicago has advanced the thesis
which finds some support in the opinions
that what the first amendment forbids is
legislation that uses religion as a basis for
classification so as to either burden or benefit religious activities. In short, religion
as such cannot be the basis for imposing
burdens or conferring privileges. Quite
clearly, under this test, federal aid to parochial schools as part of a general program of aid to schools would be constitutional, since religion or religious teaching
is not the basis for determining eligibility.
Others, such as Professor Katz, have advanced the same principle. On the other
hand, it is equally clear to me that Congress, if it chooses, may limit expenditure of
funds for educational purposes to institutions under public control. I would not regard this an unlawful discrimination, since
the distinction between institutions under
public control and those under private control is well supported in law as a basis for
classification. This would not be discrimination on religious grounds. But if Congress deliberately excluded only parochial
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schools from the benefits of federal aid legislation, a question of religious discrimination would be raised.
Others may approach the problem in
different ways to achieve the same result.
One path of thinking draws a line between
direct and indirect benefits to religion and
to religious activity, and interprets the Supreme Court's decisions to permit expenditure of federal funds in aid of valid public
objectives, including bus transportation to
parochial schools and distribution of free
secular textbooks to parochial school children, on the theory that this is not direct
aid to religious education. The same might
be said for aid to assist in the construction
of school buildings. Somewhat related is
the "child benefit" theory, namely, that
public funds may appropriately be spent
in aid for purposes that contribute to the
welfare of students regardless of the
schools and colleges they attend, such as
bus transportation, free lunches, health
care and benefits, G. I. benefits, tuition and
scholarship grants, so long as there is no
direct subsidy of religious schools and religious education.
Conclusion
As a final word, I would say that what
the Supreme Court will do with this and
other problems, if ever they reach the
Court, is an open question. The difficulty
of prediction is compounded by the fact
that we now have two new Justices on the
bench and by Mr. Justice Douglas' recent
intimation that the Everson case was incorrectly decided. If the Court adheres
to past decisions, the way continues open
for a construction of the first amendment,
along the lines of several different theories,
that would point to the validity of the use
(Continued on page 70)

